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Objectives. Financial penalties, or sanctions, are a core mechanism for enforcing the
work requirements of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program and
helping clients achieve self-sufficiency. This study’s objective is to examine whether
sanctions are being administered consistent with policy goals of encouraging
work. Methods. This study uses administrative fair hearing decisions, which are the
product of an adversarial-style procedure triggered when a client appeals an adverse
decision by the agency, including work sanctions. Qualitative content analysis is
used to analyze the decisions. Results. The study found that despite organizational
reforms, local offices had created the welfare-to-work version of an eligibility-com-
pliance culture, where sanctions were based primarily on attendance records and
became a paper-processing function. Transactions between clients and workers were
often routinized and mechanical, resulting in improper and arbitrary sanctions that
were reversed by the hearing officers nearly 50 percent of the time. Conclu-
sion. This study underscores the importance of scrutinizing and correcting agency
errors that may undercut clients’ engagement in work activities.
Financial penalties, or sanctions, are a core mechanism for enforcing the
work requirements of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. Sanctions are based on the premise
that financial penalties, or the threat of them, will enforce participation in
work programs, thus paving the way to self-sufficiency. So fundamental are
sanctions to welfare reform that states have no choice but to impose them or
risk federal penalties. Very few studies, however, have focused on how local
offices are administering sanctions and whether they are being applied cor-
rectly. Scholarly attention is focused primarily on the rates of sanction, the
characteristics of sanctioned families, and whether sanctions induce hard-
ship.
This article examines the administration of work sanctions drawing on a
novel and underutilized source of data—administrative data on fair hearing
decisions. These decisions are a product of adversarial administrative hear-
ings triggered when a client appeals an adverse decision by the agency,
including work sanctions. The specific and focused interactions that define
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the adversarial process, where each party presents facts through direct tes-
timony and evidence with a neutral third party deciding, offer a rich source
of data for researchers and administrators. Each decision provides a case
study on why the sanction was imposed, the client’s reason for not com-
plying, and frontline practices, including possible errors, in the implemen-
tation process.
The main question addressed through these data is whether sanctions are
administered appropriately and consistent with policy objectives of encour-
aging and promoting work. An erroneous or inappropriate sanction may
create financial hardship and obstacles to work. A wrongfully imposed
sanction may also discourage clients and create a less cooperative relation-
ship between worker and client. This study will thus allow policymakers and
administrators to make more informed decisions on how to avoid mistakes
that may undercut welfare reform’s goals.
Because program design and implementation varies from state to state
(and may even vary within a state), this article focuses on only one state—
Texas—and on two regions within it, one primarily rural and the other
urban/suburban. Texas was chosen because of its size (it ranks third in the
number of recipients) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2003), and while no two states are alike under welfare reform, its approach is
similar to many other states. Like virtually all states, Texas has adopted a
‘‘work-first’’ approach to self-sufficiency, requiring recipients to immediately
engage in the labor market. Its use of an outside agency to engage clients in
work activities and, more specifically, workforce development agencies, re-
flects a growing trend of using outside expertise to make TANF programs
more employment based (Martinson and Holcombe, 2002). As reported by
the Government Accountability Office (2002), nearly all states coordinate
with workforce investment services at the state or local level, with 28 states,
including Texas, relying on more formal linkages. At the time of this study,
Texas imposed a partial family sanction, as do the two states—New York
and California—with the largest numbers of recipients. Overall, 44 percent
of recipients live in states with partial benefit sanctions (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, 2003; Rowe and Versteeg, 2005). Similar
to other states, Texas imposes sanctions when a client fails to comply
with appointments for work-related services, provide sufficient evidence
of job searching efforts, or to work the required number of hours under
the law.
Background and Context
The 1996 welfare reform escalated the demands placed on the system to
move people into work. The law drastically changed the rules, including
imposing time limits, restricting definitions of work, mandating sanctions,
and imposing work-participation quotas on the states. The law also un-
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leashed a wave of organizational reforms because of the unprecedented
flexibility it allowed states in program design. In part based on past exper-
iments with welfare-to-work programs, states recognized that moving people
into work required different resources, skills, and administrative configu-
rations than processing and monitoring eligibility for cash assistance. Serv-
ice-delivery systems were reconfigured, staff responsibilities restructured, and
new relationships forged with outside service providers (Martinson and
Holcomb, 2002). In short, under welfare reform, changing the culture of
welfare offices was viewed as important as changing the rules.
The results have been mixed. Using Wisconsin as a model, Mead (2001)
contends that policy reforms, along with organizational changes, such as
integrated case-management teams, contracting with outside agencies,
merging welfare-to-work programs with other work-based programs, and
improving management information systems, have successfully transformed
the bureaucracy into an effective work-based model. However, Mead, and
others, have also found evidence of more recalcitrant bureaucracies. Riccucci
et al. (2004) found that despite organizational reforms that emphasized
work-based goals, frontline workers resisted adopting them, instead focusing
on traditional eligibly determinations (see also Lurie and Riccucci, 2003).
Similarly, Sandfort (2000) found that frontline workers’ shared beliefs and
collective knowledge about how things worked regularly superceded man-
agement’s vision or directives, even among private welfare-to-work contrac-
tors.
Several studies have suggested problems in the administration of sanc-
tions. In an independent review of all case closures in Tennessee, reviewers
found caseworkers improperly applied sanctions in 30 percent of the cases
(Goldberg and Schott, 2000). An independent government audit in Wis-
consin also found a high rate of error (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau,
2001). In Iowa, surveyed clients identified administrative problems, includ-
ing staff who were inaccessible, inefficient, and not supportive, as reasons
why they were sanctioned (Nixon, Kauff, and Lossby, 1999). In Wisconsin,
Texas, and New York, of those clients appealing work-rule violations
through the fair hearing process, 52, 53, and 77 percent, respectively, won
their cases, thus indicating errors by the local agency (Lens and Vorsanger,
2005).
Past research has attributed errors in the sanctioning process primarily to
client deficiencies, including limited education and reduced cognitive abil-
ities that inhibit understanding (Pavetti et al., 2004; Cherlin et al., 2002;
Koralek, 2000). Past research has also found that sanctioned clients are likely
to be more disadvantaged and have more obstacles to work than not-sanc-
tioned clients (Pavetti et al., 2004; Hasenfeld, Ghose, and Larson, 2004; Wu
et al., 2004; Cherlin et al., 2002; Kalil, Seefeldt, and Wang, 2002; Mancuso
and Lindler, 2001; Edelhoch, Liu, and Martin, 2000; Westra and Routley,
2000; Koralek, 2000; Fein and Lee, 1999). This study, in contrast, focuses
on administrative problems, rather than clients’ personal problems. Scant
Work Sanctions on the Frontlines of the Welfare System 575
attention has been paid to these problems in the literature; hence this study
fills a gap in our knowledge by examining agency error or practices that may
undercut attempts to engage clients, and especially disadvantaged clients, in
work activities.
Research Questions
This study uses the framework of an eligibility-compliance culture to
examine whether sanctions are being administered in a manner inconsistent
with policy goals of encouraging work. The term eligibility-compliance cul-
ture was coined by Kane and Bane (1994) to describe public welfare bu-
reaucracies that function more like claims-processing centers than social
service agencies. Workers are preoccupied with routing paperwork and ver-
ifying eligibility information (Brodkin, 1986). Interactions with clients are
depersonalized, mechanistic, and routine. Process is emphasized over a full
personal assessment of need or ‘‘the reasonableness of clients claims’’ (Kane
and Bane, 1994:19). Such a culture can lead to bureaucratic disentitlement,
where through ‘‘the obscure and routine actions of public authorities’’
(Lipsky, 1984:3), otherwise eligible people are denied aid based on process,
rather than substance. Policy goals are subverted when the program fails to
provide aid to its intended beneficiaries.
I use the framework of an eligibility-compliance culture and the bureau-
cratic disentitlement it generates to consider three questions in the context of
sanctions.
1. Do staff fully assess clients’ ability to participate in work programs?
2. Do staff treat sanctioning as a clerical task or an evaluative one?
3. Do staff apply sanctions in a manner inconsistent with policy goals?
Data Source
I use fair hearings as a data source because it is where errors of bureau-
cratic disentitlement, a primary indicator of an eligibility-compliance cul-
ture, are recorded and corrected. Hearings are initiated by clients to
challenge negative agency actions, including sanctions. As Lipsky observes,
agency reversals at hearings can serve as a marker ‘‘of continued substantive
eligibility despite bureaucratically determined ineligibility ‘‘(1984:13). They
thus can signify an eligibility-compliance culture that is unduly focused on
process at the expense of substance.
Because of the adversarial nature of hearings, practices that constitute an
eligibility-compliance culture are routinely described in the hearing record.
Both the client and agency are expected to present their case orally, confront
and cross-examine witnesses or each other, and submit evidence. Thus
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clients can include the more subtle types of practices that characterize an
eligibility-compliance culture but appear normative to a worker. For exam-
ple, clients may describe instances where a worker failed to fully assess their
ability to work, or ignored phone calls and scheduled appointments at
inconvenient times. The norms of legal decision writing, which require
hearing officers to explain their decision in writing, summarize each side’s
position, and make findings of fact and law, capture these practices in the
hearing record.
A potential limitation of fair hearing data is that only a few clients appeal.
Although sanctioned clients are twice as likely to appeal than other clients,
the appeal rate for work-related sanctions in Texas is only 2.9 percent (Lens
and Vorsanger, 2005). This percentage, however, is higher than sample sizes
used under quality control (1.5–2 percent according to Wrafter, 1984).
Moreover, while quality-control systems rely on a statistical random sample
of cases that may or may not contain errors, every fair hearing decision
contains an error of some kind, either by the agency or the client. Hearings
act as a magnet for highlighting trouble spots and areas of contention, and
hence are a useful and concentrated source for discovering agency error
(Altman, Bardo, and Furst, 1979).
The errors contained in fair hearing records cannot tell us exactly how
often, and how many, workers are committing such mistakes, but they can,
like the errors found in quality-control cases, serve as a signal of more
widespread problems. The similarity among complaints and the common
themes that emerged in this study indicated that such errors were not iso-
lated occurrences. For example, a common complaint was the inaccessibility
of workers. A worker inaccessible to one client is likely inaccessible to others.
Likewise, a worker who only takes calls at certain designated times is setting
a policy for all, not specific rules for one. The same is true for the worker
who enters sanctions too quickly into the system, or fails to help clients
gather medical proof. In short, fair hearings serve as an error indicator for
problems within the bureaucracy, providing diagnostic information on or-
ganizational practices and failures.
Relevant research on complaining behavior also support the conclusion
that the mistakes or problems identified through fair hearings are the ‘‘tip of
the iceberg’’ rather than an aberration. Specifically, studies of consumer-
complaint behavior have found most people do not complain, and those
who do typically are representative of the mass of unvoiced complaints.
Hyman, Shingler, and Miller explain in their study of the complaint be-
havior of residential utility customers that ‘‘when individual personality,
organizational, or environmental factors operate to inhibit the problem-
solving process . . . then the universe of problems perceived, voiced, and
complained will be successively smaller than the universe of problems ex-
perienced by consumers’’ (1992:100). They found that a small number of
complaints, rather than being atypical, were representative of the mass of
unvoiced complaints.
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The same is likely true in welfare bureaucracies where, more than other
institutions, individual and organizational barriers inhibit complaints, in-
cluding clients with low education levels, fear of retaliation, complex pro-
grams rules that make mistakes difficult to discover, and a lack of resources
to pursue an appeal (Lens and Vorsanger, 2005; Handler, 1986). Those
clients who do appeal may be more competent and prepared in the context
of fair hearings, thus enhancing the usefulness of the data. Moreover, as
sanctions are often routinely employed as a form of administrative diversion
( Jindal and Winstead, 2002), including in Texas during the eligibility
process, those that are appealed are more likely to be representative of this
phenomenon, rather than an atypical deviation.
For researchers, fair hearings address some of the limitations in imple-
mentation research, which often relies on retrospective reporting through
interviews or surveys of local agency staff, administrators, or clients, review
of documents and case records, and on-site observation. However, what
people say they do, or recall having done, may be different than what they
actually do. Clients and caseworkers may alter their behavior when observed.
Administrative records and site visits usually emphasize the agency’s, rather
than the client’s, perspective. In contrast, by design, fair hearings incorporate
the perspectives of both the agency and client. They also capture the actions
of the parties most interested and involved in the transaction, in the midst of
the event, and without any interference from a researcher. Their detail also
permits a deeper and more inductive type of analysis than is typically pos-
sible with large quantitative data sets. This emphasis of depth over breadth
also makes the small sample size less of a concern.
Sample and Methodology
Statistical data were first obtained to determine the reversal rate on
work-related hearings in Texas during 2002. These data were obtained
from the Texas Department of Human Services through Texas’s Freedom
of Information Law. These data indicated a statewide reversal rate of 53
percent, indicating likely errors in sanctioning since more than half of
clients had their sanctions reversed. Two regions in Texas were chosen to
provide a contrast between a primarily urban/suburban area and a more
rural area. The regions reflect geographical distinctions made by the Texas
Department of Human Services, which has divided the state into 10 separate
regions. One region is a well-populated urban/suburban region (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘‘urban/suburban region’’) and the other region is
primarily rural, with no large cities (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘rural
region’’).
Texas’s Freedom of Information Law was also used to request a random
sample of every other fair hearing decision on work rules issued in 2002.
The total sample was 178 decisions, with 109 decisions from the urban/
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suburban region and 69 from the rural region. Content analysis was used to
analyze the decisions. First, the following data were extracted verbatim from
the decision and copied onto an Excel spreadsheet: nature of work-rule
violation, agency’s description of violation, client’s reason for not comply-
ing, and hearing officer’s decision and rationale. The data were coded
manually on two different levels. I began with an open-coding inductive
approach, first locating descriptive themes (Strauss, 1987). For example, if
the hearing officer indicated that the agency failed to consider evidence in
the file, the code ‘‘ignored docs’’ would be assigned. If the client testified
that she missed her work appointment because she was working, the code
‘‘conflict with work’’ was assigned.
Second-level coding was based on the following three categories identified
from the literature review as characteristic of an eligibility-compliance cul-
ture.
1. Failing to fully assess exemptions from the work rules. Included in this
category were allegations that a client’s medical problems or other
exemptions had been overlooked, medical documentation ignored, or
that a full assessment of his or her medical condition had not been
made.
2. Viewing sanctions as a clerical rather than an evaluative task. Included in
this category were allegations of clerical errors or bureaucratic foulups
(such as miscommunication, improper coding, premature sanctioning,
and a client’s failure to receive notice of appointments) or overlooking
or ignoring obstacles to work (such as child-care or transportation
problems).
3. Administering sanctions in a manner inconsistent with policy goals. In-
cluded in this category were cases where a client was working, attend-
ing school, or otherwise attempting to comply with the work rules
when sanctioned.
First-level open codes were grouped under these thematic clusters. Thus,
for example, the open code ‘‘conflict with work’’ was placed under the
thematic category ‘‘administering sanctions in a manner inconsistent with
policy goals.’’ The open code ‘‘sanctioned automatically’’ was placed under
the category ‘‘viewing sanctions as a clerical rather than an evaluative task.’’
All cases, including those where error had not been found by the hearing
officer, but where the client alleged an eligibility-compliance-type practice,
were coded. Such allegations, stated under oath and preserved in the fair
hearing record, are an important source of information about agency prac-
tices. However, a reversal by a hearing officer is perhaps stronger proof of an
eligibility-compliance culture than the client’s allegation standing alone.
Coding was conducted solely by the researcher. To assure reliability, a
research assistant conducted second-level coding on 15 cases, with an in-
tercoder reliability rating above 90 percent.
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Limitations
One limitation of the data is that they were available only by region, as
designated by the Texas Department of Human Services, and not by county
or individual offices. Comparisons could be made only between state-des-
ignated regions, each of which consisted of multiple counties, local offices,
and workforce boards. Thus, it was not possible to determine variations in
practice among counties or local offices, or to distinguish well-performing
offices from poorly performing ones. As noted above, it was also not possible
to determine the extent of the practices and errors, but only that they were
occurring. However, the fact that similar patterns and practices were found
among two very different regions minimizes these limitations.
Another limitation is shared with all implementation studies, which by
their very nature are primarily limited to the studied sites. This is especially
true under welfare reform because of the flexibility afforded states in pro-
gram design and administration. How sanctions are imposed may vary even
more as individual case managers often have considerable discretion in their
application (Pavetti et al., 2004; Koralek, 2000). On the other hand, sanc-
tions are a universal tool used by all welfare offices and studying their
application can provide important insights on the administration of sanc-
tions in complex bureaucratic systems.
Findings and Discussion
Texas initiated its present welfare-to-work program, ‘‘Texas Works,’’ in
November 1997. Like other welfare-to-work programs across the country, it
reconfigured its welfare system to emphasize work. It uses the tools man-
dated by TANF, including time limits and imposing sanctions for non-
compliance and, as is typical under welfare reform, has contracted with
outside agencies to implement work rules and provide employment services.
The Texas Department of Human Services maintains responsibility for de-
termining eligibility, while the work program, named Choices, is run by a
separate state agency, the Texas Workforce Commission. The Commission
works through local workforce development boards and their service con-
tractors (profit and nonprofit) to provide all work-related services and
monitor clients’ compliance with work requirements.
The failure to comply with work requirements results in a grant reduction
of $78 for failing to participate in Choices, and $25 for voluntarily quitting a
job (Texas Works Handbook). The maximum grant for a family of three is
$208; thus a sanction can reduce the grant by more than a third. Minimum
penalty periods also apply, and are set at one month (or until the client
complies, whichever is longer) for the first noncompliance, and then three and
six months thereafter. Choices staff decides whether a violation has occurred;
the Texas Department of Human Services implements the sanction.
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As described below, errors and practices indicative of an eligibility-com-
pliance culture appeared in the fair hearing record, as indicated by the
practices reported by clients and a reversal rate of nearly half of all cases
(48.6 percent in the urban/suburban region and 49.2 percent in the rural
region). There was also very little difference between the urban/suburban
and rural region; similar errors and practices plagued both regions. (Because
of this, unless otherwise indicated, the findings are not distinguished by
region.) This lack of variation underscores the ubiquitous nature of eligi-
bility-compliance cultures in public welfare bureaucracies, transcending even
differences in setting. The next sections describe these errors and practices in
the context of the three defining features of an eligibility-compliance culture
described above: the lack of full individualized assessments, an undue em-
phasis on clerical tasks, and the rigid application of rules in ways that subvert
policy goals.
Do Staff Fully Assess Clients’ Ability to Participate in Work Programs?
Clients who are unable to work because of a disability, or who are preg-
nant or caring for a child under one or a disabled family member, are
exempt from the work rules (Texas Works Handbook). Staff at the Texas
Department of Human Services are responsible for making this determi-
nation before clients are sent to the local workforce board for employment
services. Problems with the assessment process occurred in 40 cases, with 33
in the urban/suburban region and 7 in the rural region. (Overall frequency
counts sum more than N because multiple errors and practices were alleged
or found in each case.) In several cases, the agency coded the client incor-
rectly as employable, and conceded the mistake at the hearing. By itself, such
errors are not necessarily an indication of an eligibility-compliance culture.
Mechanical-type errors are likely to occur in any large bureaucracy; in fact,
these errors occurred primarily in the urban/suburban region where case-
loads are higher and hence more difficult to track. On the other hand, that
such errors were not corrected prior to a hearing indicate gaps in quality-
control systems, and perhaps a certain tolerance of mistakes that may lead to
erroneous sanctions.
In both regions, the hearing officers identified more intentional errors that
demonstrated an unwillingness to help clients document their exemption or,
as is common in an eligibility-compliance culture, a negative parsing of doc-
umentation. For example, in one case, the client had submitted a physician’s
note reporting a disability onset date of 1998, with the client still unable to
work in October 2001. The agency found the note insufficient because it did
not indicate how long the disability was expected to last. The hearing officer
reversed the sanction, noting that the agency had failed to advise the client her
documentation was incomplete. The hearing officer stated that the ‘‘worker
must offer reasonable assistance in obtaining information.’’
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In another case, the worker had missed cues, available in the file, that the
client was disabled. Specifically, the client had been terminated from a job
because of medical problems. This information was ignored by the worker,
who coded the client as nonexempt and referred her to the local workforce
board where she was subsequently sanctioned. The hearing officer found
that the agency ‘‘did not thoroughly grasp, explore, or document in her
electronic case file the information the client provided regarding her em-
ployment status.’’
Other times, the agency made referrals to the local workforce agency
without giving clients the opportunity to present medical documentation.
For example, in one case, the client was sanctioned before the time limit for
providing medical documentation; in other cases, clients were not given an
opportunity to provide verification from their physicians, or were not told
what type of documentation they needed. Thus, at times, workers not only
failed to assist clients in securing needed documentation, but also hindered
clients’ attempts to secure it.
However, some clients were also not disclosing their disabilities to work-
ers, waiting until the hearing to claim a medical problem and then failing to
sufficiently document it. The failure may have been due, in part, to a client’s
hesitancy to disclose his or her medical condition or because no such med-
ical problem existed. However, it could also stem from a depersonalized and
routinized assessment process where such disclosures are not encouraged.
In sum, the errors found by the hearing officers, and practices alleged by
the clients, including workers who failed to assist clients in documenting
their exemption, cursory reviews, and ignoring or rejecting medical docu-
mentation without giving clients the time or an opportunity to elaborate, are
indicative of an eligibility-compliance culture. These errors of process cre-
ated bureaucratic hurdles and obscured substantive facts; here, that clients
had valid reasons for not complying with work rules. As is characteristic of
eligibility-compliance cultures where process often takes precedence over
substance, faulty procedures led to the reduction of aid to clients entitled to
exemptions.
Do Staff View Sanctioning as a Clerical Task or an Evaluative One?
In Texas, as described above, agencies under contract to the workforce
boards decide when a client has failed to comply with the work rules.
Violations can occur when clients are preparing for work (such as employ-
ment planning sessions, career advancement classes, or job search training)
or when clients are actually working or searching for a job and are required
to report their hours or job contacts. Most of the violations occurred during
the work preparation stage, and most—71 percent in the rural region and
67.8 percent in the urban/suburban region—were based on a single missed
appointment at the workforce agency. In some cases, sanctions would be
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entered days after the infraction, in other cases it would occur weeks later
(and perhaps some never entered at all), thus indicating that workers likely
used their discretion when applying sanctions.
In 129 of the cases (81 in the urban/suburban region and 48 in the rural
region), there were indications that sanctioning was viewed as a clerical task
rather than an evaluative one. Bureaucratic foulups and ‘‘red tape,’’ rather
than an assessment that clients were unwilling to work, appeared to underlie
many of the sanctions. Allegations of miscommunications between clients
and workers were common, as were complaints from clients that they did
not receive notice of their appointment. Obstacles to work, such as daycare
and a lack of transportation, were overlooked. Perhaps the most extreme
example of a mechanical approach to sanctioning occurred where the hear-
ing officer found that the workforce agency ‘‘had requested a sanction before
the appellant showed up for the appointment,’’ which she was late for. In
another case, the client was two minutes late for a required test. She re-
scheduled that day and had already taken the test when she received the
sanction notice. Thus, some workers were on automatic when imposing
sanctions, viewing it solely as a clerical task.
There was also evidence that clients, and even workers, had a hard time
cutting through the bureaucracy to correct or prevent mistakes. For example,
in the case of the rescheduled test described above, the workforce agency
representative testified that she tried to reverse the sanction but that it did
not go through the computer system, so she advised the client to appeal. In
another case, the representative testified that she had requested the sanction
be removed because no appointment had been scheduled for the client to
miss, but it was not corrected. Some of these problems resulted from a lack
of coordination between the workforce agency and the local welfare office.
A common theme throughout clients’ testimony was their difficulty in
contacting their worker to notify them of obstacles to complying with the
work rules. As one client described, when her daughter became ill on the day
of her work appointment she made repeated and unsuccessful attempts to
call the agency, and ‘‘started putting in extensions at random and left voice
messages for everyone she found.’’ Another client testified to three unsuc-
cessful attempts to reach his worker, who was first at lunch, then at a
doctor’s appointment, and then at a training. He explained that ‘‘each call
cost him fifty cents and that he didn’t have the money to keep on calling.’’
Another client was told that her worker was not accepting calls; and then was
later told by the worker that she only accepts calls one day a week.
In sum, such cases demonstrate that at times the sanctioning process was a
reductive one, with workers avoiding complex and subtle determinations on
whether a client was unable or unwilling to work and instead relying on the
client’s overt performance: Did he or she attend the required work activity?
Imposing sanctions became a paper-processing task, with clerical errors oc-
curring or going uncorrected because staff insulated themselves from contact
with clients. The choice to ‘‘paper process’’ rather than ‘‘people process’’ is
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a central feature of an eligibility-compliance culture. So, too, is the some-
times byzantine nature of such a culture, exemplified here by workers relying
on fair hearings to correct their own mistakes.
Do Staff Apply Sanctions in a Manner that Subverts Policy Goals?
Sanctions are based on the premise that financial penalties, or the threat of
them, are necessary to enforce the obligation to work. Presumably, clients
who are already working or engaged in training or educational activities do
not require a sanction to motivate them. In both regions, however, sanc-
tioned clients included those already working or in a related activity. In 30
of the cases (19 in the urban/suburban region and 11 in the rural region)
sanctions were applied when clients were attempting to work or working, or
otherwise demonstrating a commitment to work.
For several of these clients, the workforce appointment created a sched-
uling conflict. Thus, one client whose sanction was reversed attended classes
in the morning Monday through Thursday and in the afternoon did court-
mandated community service and worked. She also cared for her two
grandchildren. She was sanctioned for not having enough job search con-
tacts during Christmas vacation. The hearing officer noted that the Texas
Works Handbook did not specifically extend work requirements through
scheduled college class vacations and that based on the client’s activities,
additional participation requirements were not needed over the Christmas
break. He also noted that the worker should use ‘‘discretion and proper
judgment in making eligibility decisions using common sense, program
knowledge, experience and expertise.’’ Finally, the hearing officer noted that
the client’s request to schedule work meetings on Friday mornings was
ignored, even though the worker was available. In another case, the hearing
officer reversed a sanction for a client who had voluntarily joined the work
program to obtain childcare and who had missed his appointment because
he was working 60–70 hours a week driving a cab.
However, sanctioning clients who missed appointments because they were
working was not always considered reversible error. One client was busy
cleaning houses at the time of her work appointment. Another client worked
in the mornings when work appointments were usually scheduled; she ex-
plained that while she understood she was supposed to attend, she could not
miss work. The hearing officers noted that the agency was following stated
policy regarding work-participation requirements. Other hearing officers
chastised clients for not making time for appointments. As one pointed out
to a client who attended classes in the morning and community service and
work in the afternoon, ‘‘there was still time to take care of the business with
TWC (Texas Workforce Commission) if she wished to receive TANF.’’
Only the most egregious cases, as described above, were reversed, although it
was not clear where the line was drawn.
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There was some indication that workers were focused on the overall goals
of TANF, but that the rules distorted their behavior. This was most evident
in a case from the rural region, where both the agency representative and the
Choices representative testified on behalf of the client that the rules required
them to impose a sanction but that the client had good reasons for not
complying. The workforce representative noted that the client had finished
at the top of her class with perfect attendance even though she had a very
long bus ride, but that there were almost no job opportunities in the small
community where she lived. She further explained that most entry-level jobs
were in the evening shift after public transportation stopped running. The
hearing officer reversed the sanction, suggesting that the client request an
exemption from the work rules because of these barriers.
In sum, at times workers either felt constrained by the rules or were
unduly focused on the immediate task of scheduling and monitoring at-
tendance at work appointments rather than the larger goal of encouraging
self-sufficiency. Sanctioning was viewed as a clerical chore detached from its
primary purpose, which is to encourage work. What was relevant was the
immediate appointment at hand, not whether the client was working or
otherwise displaying a positive attitude toward work. Sanctioning a client for
choosing work over an appointment to discuss work is a clear example of the
subversion of policy goals. Such goal displacement is common in eligibility-
compliance cultures, where the focus is often on the rules and not their
underlying purpose.
Conclusion and Future Implications
The stated goal of welfare reform is to decrease dependency and promote
work and self-sufficiency. Sanctions and mandatory work requirements are
one means to this goal. Equally as emphasized is changing the culture of
welfare offices. The nearly equal attention paid to policy and organizational
reform under the PRWORA is one of its strengths, as it is the routine
encounters between clients and workers on the frontline that translate policy
into action, and that determines its success or failure. As Brodkin warns, ‘‘if
welfare state reforms are to create meaningful change, they must affect
service production at the street level’’ (2000:1). Service delivery is an es-
pecially salient issue for welfare bureaucracies whose street-level operations
have been a persistent source of concern and criticism over the decades.
As this, and other studies, confirm, organizational change has sometimes
been difficult to achieve under welfare reform. Lurie and Riccucci, in their
study of several post-TANF welfare offices, attribute the continuation of
old-style problems in new-style welfare offices to the very organizational
configurations precipitated by welfare reform. As they explain: ‘‘Where re-
sponsibility for work activities was transferred to a specialized agency, there
was little need for the welfare agency to become, in Moynihan’s words, an
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employment and training program that provided income support . . . In
transferring this responsibility to another organization, welfare leaders and
administrators changed personnel rather than changing the behavior and
culture of the workers in a welfare agency’’ (2003:674–75). However, as
Sandfort (2000) has found, even some of the newer organizations, including
private welfare-to-work contractors, have replicated some of the worst prac-
tices of public bureaucracies by emphasizing attendance monitoring and
paper work rather than more interactive and meaningful activities.
One reason for this continued reliance on old bureaucratic practices de-
spite reforms may be the difficulty of implementing the dual approach of
‘‘help(ing) and hassl(ing),’’ which Mead (2003:578) contends is the key to
behavioral-based reforms. On the one hand, workers may encourage work in
an upbeat way, emphasizing the client’s strengths and helping overcome
barriers (Hamilton and Scrivener, 1999). On the other hand, these same
barriers may sometimes be viewed by workers as an excuse not to work.
Discerning the unable client from the unwilling, or the client who is better
motivated by help or hassle (or vice versa), is a difficult task. Workers faced
with conflicting and difficult demands will often respond by routinizing
their work (Meyers and Dillon, 1999; Hagen, 1987; Brodkin, 1997).
The severity of the barriers clients face may also encourage workers to
bureaucratize, rather than individualize, sanctions. As noted above, re-
searchers have repeatedly found that the most disadvantaged clients, with the
most barriers to work, are more likely to be sanctioned. Workers are often
unable to help such clients because of a lack of resources or skills (Marks,
1999; Meyers, Glasser, and MacDonald, 1998). Sanctioning may be the
easier and simpler alternative. Frustrated with being unable to help, workers
may dismiss barriers as exaggerated or the client’s fault, thus justifying
imposing a sanction rather than securing scarce supports. Bell (forthcom-
ing), in her study of frontline workers in Texas, found this dynamic at work
among the majority of caseworkers she interviewed. Caseworkers often ig-
nored or sidestepped clients’ barriers, instead labeling the hardest to serve as
unmotivated, and hence in need of sanctions rather than supports. This
dynamic is similar to the creaming phenomenon identified in past studies of
the welfare bureaucracy, where frustrated and overwhelmed frontline work-
ers often treated the most disadvantaged clients more harshly (Lispky,
1984). In the past, such clients would be bureaucratically disentitled from
aid during the application or recertification process; sanctions may serve as
the present conduit for this process.
Some argue that rigid work rules backed up with sanctions with little or
no wiggle room promotes work and individual responsibility, and hence
would not be a subversion of the policy goals underlying TANF (Rector,
1997; Mead, 1997). Sanctions applied in this way would function as a
diversion program, similar to other administrative diversion programs that
have helped reduce welfare rolls ( Jindal and Winstead, 2002). Whereas in
the past such diversion programs were often considered illegal, today, along
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with work rules and sanctions, they are considered by some the key to
welfare reform.
However, scholars disagree over whether sanctions work. Lee, Slack, and
Lewis (2004) found sanctions were negatively associated with formal em-
ployment and earnings, and had no effect on welfare use. Similarly, Hamilton
and Scrivener (1999) found that sanctions do not increase participation rates
or compliance with requirements. In contrast, Hofferth, Stanhope, and Harris
(2000) found that sanctions lead to increased employment exits from welfare.
However, even assuming that a strict application of sanctions is useful, the
intrusion of an eligibility-compliance culture into the sanctioning process is
not. Sanctions imposed without a full assessment and with an element of
bureaucratic randomness or arbitrariness can frustrate work rather than en-
courage it. It can make work harder for clients forced to juggle workforce
appointments with work, convince skeptical workers of their desire to work,
and expend energy on correcting bureaucratic mistakes. They can increase
financial hardship and discourage clients who are already more likely to be
disadvantaged, and have more barriers to work, than nonsanctioned clients.
In sum, if both ‘‘help and hassle’’ are to be applied equally, there is much
that can be improved in both arenas. When administering sanctions, work-
ers could define their roles expansively, focusing less on collecting and ver-
ifying information and more on fully assessing clients and exploring
resources and options that fit their needs. Sanctions could be individualized,
taking into account the client’s circumstances and overall work behavior. A
single missed appointment, without more, would rarely form the basis of a
sanction. Actual work would be valued over appointments to discuss work.
Sanctions would work in tandem with supports, not instead of them.
This study demonstrates the harmful side of sanctions. Although the full
extent of such practices, either in TANF agencies or at the local workforce
boards, cannot be determined from the data, the findings signal that more
needs to be done to ensure that sanctions are administered appropriately.
Further research is needed to determine how endemic such practices are to
welfare and workforce bureaucracies, why they are occurring despite organ-
izational reforms, and how they can be rectified, or whether the utility of
sanctions for encouraging work needs to be reexamined.
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